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ABSTRACT
Relying on network theory and power dependence theory, we develop a series of
hypotheses that focus on determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover in IPO firms.
We studied CEOs who had been with their companies at the IPO with a sample of 120 firms.
The results indicate that having outsiders on the board of directors, selling shares at the time
of the IPO, and being a part-time CEO all increase the risk of CEO turnover.  CEO tenure at
the time of the IPO, however, reduces turnover.  Contrary to what we expected, being the
founder of the company has no effect on CEO turnover.
Keywords:  CEOs, Turnover, Event History Analysis
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A major theoretical concern that entrepreneurship researchers have is that academic
research is biased toward large established organizations (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Snell, 1992).
Research on organizational leaders is no exception.  While it is certain that such studies as
Begley and Boyd (1986), Castaldi (1986), Daily and Dalton (1993), and Miller and Toulouse
(1986a, 1986b) have contributed to advance our understanding about roles and characteristics
of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in entrepreneurial firms, it is hard to claim that our
knowledge in this research field is sufficient.
Particularly, it seems that little effort has been made to research CEO turnover in initial
public offering (IPO) firms.  Given the importance of the IPO as a stage in the firm’s growth
cycle (the IPO results in cash that will finance the organization’s future growth), an
understanding of leadership at this stage could aid in our knowledge of leadership,
entrepreneurship, and firm growth.  CEO turnover after the IPO may have significant negative
or positive associations with organizational performance (i.e. Carroll, 1984; Haveman, 1993).
CEO tenure may also be associated with the firm’s ability to adapt to the changing
environment (i.e. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).  However, with some
exceptions (i.e. Bruton, Fried, & Hisrich, 1997), few studies have examined the determinants of
CEO turnover in entrepreneurial firms (Rubenson & Gupta, 1996).
The role of the CEO may be particularly important in entrepreneurial firms where each
individual’s contribution is more manifest.   In addition, the impact of the CEO may be even
higher for IPO firms, which are newly in the public eye, which must make internal changes to
manage the new reporting requirements of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC),
and which are now more accountable to the general public.  Being at this stage in the firm’s
growth cycle (the IPO) may accelerate cycles of organizational change and give more
importance to CEO turnover.  Given the potential criticality of CEO  presence in entrepreneurial
firms, particularly at the time of the IPO, our study contributes to the entrepreneurship and
leadership literatures by examining the determinants of CEO tenure for up to five years after
the IPO.
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to predict causes of CEO turnover in IPO firms.
Particularly, we focus on CEOs who were in their jobs at the time of the initial public offering
(IPO).  We use network theory and power dependence theory to construct seven hypotheses.
We predict that (1) embeddedness of the firms stabilizes resource inflows and then extends
CEO tenure, (2) co-optation enables firms to secure resource inflows but increases CEO
turnover, and (3) CEO power reduces the risk of turnover.  We use organizational and CEO
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data from 120 firms that initiated their IPO in 1988 to test these hypotheses with an event
history methodology.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
We use two interrelated theoretical discourses to develop hypotheses on CEO turnover
in IPO firms: network theory and power dependence theory.  It should be noted that, because
power is considered to be an outcome of relationships (Emerson, 1962), it is not correct to
emphasize a clear distinction between these two conceptual approaches.  In fact, Davis and
Powell (1992) point out the entangled connections between the two theories.  However, as will
be evident below, in operationalizing CEO power, we did not use relationship variables to
measure levels of CEO resource dependence.  Instead, we utilized variables that describe
contexts and historical paths that should be associated with CEO power.
Network Theory
One of the fundamental theses that we use to predict CEO turnover in IPO firms is that
ongoing social relationships shape organizational behavior in combination with each
organization’s characteristics and problems.  Network theory presumes that “one’s behavior is
really explicable without reference to previous and persisting effects of interaction with others
and the overall pattern of such interactions in groups” (Granovetter, 1986: 31).  Organizational
actors are embedded in a network of relationships that restrict and constrain options of and
choices of behavior.  In a broader theoretical context, the theory provides a counter argument
against the rational economic model in that behavior is not an outcome of rational calculations
for maximizing self-interests.
Empirical studies have supported this fundamental idea by providing evidence that
social linkages and connections indeed shape various aspects of behavior.  At the
organizational level, for instance, linkages and connections shape evaluations of other
organizations (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991), adoptions of organizational strategies (i.e. Davis,
1991; Greve, 1995; Haunschild, 1993), and adoptions of organizational structures (i.e. Burns &
Wholey, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhoa, 1993).
Another crucial contribution that network theory has made is that linkages and
connections are sources of resources.  It is possible to trace the origin of this idea to the
cybernetic view of organizations (Emery & Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968).  The cybernetic view
holds that organizations are not self-sufficient and need to interact with other organizations for
procuring resources for their survival.  Interorganizational linkages, that provide access to
resources, help organizations procure necessary resources, cope with environmental
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uncertainty, and increase their survival rates (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Podony, 1994; Sterarns,
Hoffman, & Heide, 1987; Wiewel & Hunter, 1985).
Previous research found that environmental stability extends CEO tenure, and
environmental instability enhances CEO turnover.  This is because CEO succession is a
means for organizations to facilitate adaptation to a changing environment (Osbron, Jauch,
Martin, & Glueck, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986;
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).  Thus, if the CEO can create a situation where environment
stability is increased, risk of CEO turnover is reduced.  One way to enhance environmental
stability is for the CEO to create interorganizational linkages.  By doing so, the CEO stabilizes
resource flows and the environment.  Therefore, the greater the number of linkages, the lower
the risk of CEO turnover.
Hypothesis 1: Linkages with the external environment reduce CEO turnover.
There are indeed various types of interorganizational linkages (e.g. customers,
suppliers, government, financial institutions etc.).  Monge and Eisenberg (1987) discussed the
multi-dimensionality of social ties.  They noted that various types of interorganizational
linkages may have different effects on organizational outcomes.  This multi-dimensionality
argument suggests the importance of analyzing effects of different types of interorganizational
linkages as well as the total number of ties within the firm.  In our study, we examine three
types of interorganizational linkages: ties with (1) suppliers, (2) financial institutions including
investment banks, banks, venture capitalists, and investing firms, and (3) government.  We will
save an articulation about how different types of interorganizational linkages have different
effects on CEO turnover until later in the manuscript.
Co-optation and interlocking are additional forms of interorganizational linkages that are
particularly effective to stabilize the political environment.  A series of co-optation and
interlocking research has found that organizations are able to manage and coordinate
interdependence between organizations by incorporating representatives from external
organizations into their own decision making processes (i.e. Palmer, 1983; Pfeffer, 1973;
Selznick, 1949).  By having organizational goals and objectives reflect external demand and
interest of others, co-optations enable firms to increase political support from the environment.
However, this stability is not obtained without costs (Burt, 1980).  For example,
incorporating outsiders on the boards of directors influences organizational governance
structures that may reduce organizational autonomy.  Reduced autonomy enhances outsider
power to choose organizational leaders (Weisbach, 1988).  Indeed, Allen and Panian (1982)
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found negative effects of presence of outsiders in the board of directors on CEO tenure.  We
expect that firms risk CEO tenure to gain political support through co-optation.  As a result, the
presence of outsiders on the board of directors should be linked with CEO turnover after the
IPO.
Hypothesis 2: Outsiders on the board of directors increases CEO turnover.
Power Dependence Theory
Previous research about CEO tenure found positive effects of CEO power on tenure:
the more power a CEO has, the longer her/his tenure (Allen & Panian, 1982; Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991; Ocasio, 1994).  It is not hard to imagine a close connection between CEO
power and the tenure when we reconsider the definition of power.  Power is defined as “the
potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance,
and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do” (Pfeffer, 1992: 30).  Power
enables CEOs not only to increase support to themselves but also to reject threats to replace
them.  Replacements of CEOs are least likely to take place when CEO power is
institutionalized (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Ocasio, 1994).
First, Ocasio (1994) found that dynamic changes in organizational environment trigger
de-institutionalization of CEO power that leads to the turnover.  Going public is a major event
in the firm history that involves major change.  It occurs when owners of organizations (i.e.
entrepreneurs and equity of owners of the ventures) sell some part of the company to the
public by registering a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Going
public enables firms to obtain capital, borrow more capital from external sources, raise their
equity, and increase prestige and trustworthiness (Hisrich & Peters, 1992).
On the other hand, it also involves some drawbacks such as requirements of
information disclosure and loss of organizational autonomy.  While going public is certainly a
major event for all CEOs in entrepreneurial firms, we anticipate that going public has more
impact on CEOs who are founders of their firms.  This is because founder CEOs may not have
management know-how and experience for running firms that have reached the IPO stage.  If
so, going public is an opportunity for founder CEOs to be evaluated by external actors (in
terms of whether or not they have right competencies to continue to lead the firm to the post-
IPO stage).  Given this logic, we speculate that founder CEOs are more likely to leave the
company after the IPO.
Hypothesis 3: A founder CEO is more likely to leave the firm after the IPO.
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Second, skewed information distribution in organizations creates skewed power
distribution and enhances power of the information holders (Michels, 1949).  In some
entrepreneurial firms, CEOs occupy a position of “President” as well as that of CEO.  This
multi-position occupation increases information concentration so that President CEOs may
have more information and more power than do non-President CEOs.  In addition, CEOs in
IPO firms may work as part-timers.  This part-time commitment reduces their capability to
procure information and, thus, decreases their power.
Hypothesis 4: A “President CEO” is less likely to leave the company after the IPO.
Hypothesis 5: A “Part-time CEO” is more likely to leave the company after the IPO.
Third, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) and Ocasio (1994) suggest an association
between CEO power and years of service.  Longer tenure means more experience in the
organization.  This experience helps CEOs map new phenomenon on their cognitive
frameworks, and this information can be used to respond to emerging environmental
challenges (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levitt & March, 1989).  Also, the experience facilitates
learning about crucial actors surrounding organizations and about ways to get along with them
for acquiring resources and supports.  Tenure provides CEOs with political information about
their organization and the social know-how about how to run the firm.  This knowledge
contributes to the institutionalization of CEO power, which reduces CEO turnover after the IPO.
Hypothesis 6: Tenure of the CEO at the time of the IPO reduces turnover after the IPO.
Finally, researchers argue that ownership structure can influence aspects of CEO
behavior and status (i.e. Allen & Panian, 1982; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Mangel & Singh,
1993; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980).  Going public changes ownership structure and makes firms
become less financially dependent on certain actors like CEOs because these individuals sell
their stocks to the public.  This reduced dependence on the CEO decreases CEO power and
increases the risk that he/she may leave the firm.
However, in order to spur trading in the company’s stock, the owners need to sell
shares.  Thus, a firm that is performing well may be doing so, in part, because the CEO chose
to sell shares (thus increasing the number of shares that can be openly traded).  Because
previous research has found that successful organizational performance (e.g. stock price
increases) extends CEO tenure (Osborn et al., 1981; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Tushman &
Romanell, 1985), it may be that high levels of CEO selling at the IPO (reduction in their
ownership) may decrease turnover (because firm performance is increased).  Hence, direction
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of the effects of change in CEO ownership at IPO on CEO tenure may be either positive or
negative.  The following hypothesis, therefore, does not specify the direction.
Hypothesis 7: Reduction in CEO ownership at the time of the IPO will be related to
her/his tenure after the IPO.
METHOD
We examine data obtained from 120 firms that initiated their IPO in 1988 and
completed the process in either 1988 or 1989.  Approximately 250 firms filed securities
registrations with SEC in 1988.  Our data includes firms for which we could obtain a
prospectus and a proxy statement for 1989.  In addition, we only studied firms that provided a
good or service (some firms did not have employees, were real estate trusts or other financial
types of institutions without employees).
The data were created from two different sources: (1) the prospectus and (2) the
annual proxy statement for each firm (see Appendix 1 for the variable list).  The prospectus is
the document provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to the public offering.
It is also the document circulated by the underwriters to assess demand for the firm’s stock.
The prospectus for 1988 was not readily available in public sources.  Therefore, copies were
obtained from Disclosure, which is a data clearing house for the Securities and Exchange
Commission.  We coded the prospectus to obtain measures of all covariates in the model.
Independent Variables
Independent variables were all obtained from the company’s prospectus.  We read
through the prospectus and obtained all data that are listed in Appendix 1.  The coding
process involved was done in two separate steps to assure accuracy in recording of the data.
The first step involved summarizing the prospectus in a five-page summary.  The second step
involved using the summary data, along with the prospectus (as a cross check) to code the
variables of interest.
All relationship or external tie variables were obtained by reading the biographies of the
directors (both inside and outside directors) listed in the prospectus and scanning all
information in the management section (see Andrews, 1995 for details about the data and the
coding scheme process).   Because the affiliations must be disclosed to the SEC (required by
law), this seemed a reasonable way to obtain the data.  All ties with various groups (such as
financial institutions or government) were coded and then summed for each company (multiple
people can have different types of contacts).  Therefore, the ‘tie’ variable is not dichotomous.
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If a firm has multiple affiliates with ties, then the number is higher.  The sum of the ties with
various organizations is used as our measure of linkages.
Other variables such as tenure of the CEO at the time of the IPO, full-time or part-time
status of the CEO, percentage of outside directors, reduction in CEO stock at the time of the
IPO, industry, firm size, and whether the firm has international operations were also coded
from the prospectus.  The coding was all done in two steps (described earlier), thus assuring
accuracy of the data.
Dependent Variable
We obtained the annual proxy statements for each firm from 1989 to 1993 in order to
trace changes of CEOs in these IPO firms.  The proxy was updated annually so that the time
unit for CEO tenure is year, rather than day or month.  We read through the management
section of each proxy statement and coded our CEO turnover variable as a “1” if the CEO who
was with the company at the time of the IPO (data obtained from the prospectus) was no
longer CEO of the company.  We coded a “0” if the CEO who had been with the firm at the
time of the IPO was still CEO at the time the proxy was written.
The maximum years of CEO tenure are five.  As noted above, we limited our focus to
tenure and turnover of those who were CEO at the point of IPO.  The detailed description of
this data set is also available in Cyr and Welbourne (1997) and Welbourne and Andrews
(1996).
Control Variables
We used the following three variables as control variables.  The first is industry
(whether the firm was in manufacturing or service).  Given the relatively small sample size, we
chose not to use a more extensive industry coding scheme (due to degree of freedom needed
for the analysis).  The second is organizational size.  And lastly, we controlled for whether the
firm was international (had international sales and/or operations) at the time of the IPO.  Both
size and international status may have effects on CEO power; therefore, we decided to include
those two variables as controls.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the covariates.
The highest correlation coefficient is found between CEO Years of Service and Size of
Organization (r = .44), meaning that larger firms tend have CEOs with longer years of service.
The relatively low correlation between the covariates in Table 1 ensures that an issue of multi-
collinearity will not hinder our analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std.
Dev.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Executive ties with
suppliers
0.33 0.83 1.00
2 Executive ties with
financial institutions
0.14 0.29 0.18 1.00
3 Executive ties with
government
0.10 0.52 0.13 0.12 1.00
4 Percentage of outside
directors
0.56 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.02 1.00
5 Founder CEO 0.40 0.49 0.04-0.12 0.07 -0.16 1.00
6 President CEO 0.46 0.50 0.02 0.15-0.06 0.23-0.25 1.00
7 Full-time CEO 0.87 0.34 -0.09-0.11-0.13 0.14 0.21 0.06 1.00
8 CEO's tenure at time of
IPO
6.18 6.35 -0.05-0.14-0.09-0.03 0.01 -0.30 0.20 1.00
9 Reduction of CEO's
stock
0.69 0.15 0.11 0.04-0.03 0.07-0.22 0.02-0.09 0.05 1.00
10 Industry (service vs.
manufacturing)
0.53 0.50 -0.15-0.07-0.08-0.05 0.20 -0.07 0.04 -0.18-0.04 1.00
11 Size (number of
employees)
4.78 1.98 0.06 0.09-0.15 0.18-0.08-0.05 0.27 0.44 0.17 0.01 1.00
12 International status
(yes/no)
0.05 0.21 -0.08 0.12-0.04-0.14-0.19-0.06-0.32-0.14 0.27 -0.08 -0.211.00
Of our sample, 58 % were in service industries, and 5 % were firms coded as being
international.  The average firm size is 681 (s.d. = 1,670).  However, 50 percent of the firms
had less than 130 employees.  Of CEOs in our sample, 40% were founder CEOs, 46 % were
President CEOs, and 13% were part-time CEOs.  A methodological concern for our analyses is
the skewed distribution in Executive Ties with Government.  A total of 94 % of the firms in the
sample do not have any executive ties with government.  About 4 % of the firms have one tie
with government, about 1 % has three ties, and the other 1 % has four ties
Table 2 presents results of the life table analysis.  The life table analysis informs us of
characteristics of CEO tenure and timing of the turnover.  It should be noted that, due to either
bankruptcy or mergers, some firms disappeared in the very short time after IPO.
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Table 2: Life Table Analysis
N of CEOs N of CEO Survival Cumulative Hazard
Turnover Rates Failure Rates
All 1988 119 25 1.00 0.00 0.00
1989 94 10 0.92 0.08 0.08
1990 84 16 0.79 0.21 0.16
1991 68 8 0.72 0.28 0.09
1992 60 0.65 0.35 0.10
Founder 1988 42 7 1.00 0.00 0.00
CEO 1989 35 2 0.97 0.03 0.03
1990 33 8 0.79 0.21 0.21
1991 25 3 0.72 0.28 0.09
1992 22 0.66 0.34 0.09
Non-Founder 1988 62 7 1.00 0.00 0.00
CEO 1989 55 8 0.89 0.11 0.12
1990 47 7 0.79 0.21 0.11
1991 40 5 0.71 0.29 0.11
1992 35 0.64 0.36 0.11
Given that our sample is a group of fairly high risk firms (due to their engaging in their
IPOs and being relatively younger and smaller), we had to deal with the fact that firm survival
unfortunately confounded our CEO survival measure.  A firm may have gone out of business
during the five year period of our study.  Thus, we needed to make decisions about how to
handle the data when a firm went out of business but retained the original CEO until that point
in time (e.g. is this to be considered turnover for our CEO data?). After five years, about 70 per
cent of the firms in our sample were still in business as of year-end 1992 (5 years after the
IPO).  When we “count” CEO turnover as an event when a firm disappears, then about 43 per
cent of the CEOs left during this five-year period.  When we assume that CEO turnover does
not occur when the firm goes out of business, then 35 % of the CEOs left the firm during this
five-year period.
There were several options available for handling the firm survival and turnover, and we
decided to use the most methodologically conservative option data (See Clarkberg,
Chief Executive Officer Tenure WP 99-01
Page 12
Stolzenberg, & Waite, 1995).  We presumed that in firms going out of business CEO turnover
did not occur, even though CEOs may have lost their job due to firm disappearance.
If we take this approach to identify CEO turnover, of the CEOs who left their
corporations, 40 % of the turnover events took place between the second and the third year
after the IPO.  CEO risk of leaving is highest during this time period.  Table 2 also presents two
different life tables that reports effects of Founder CEO on the turnover (see also Figure 1).
Figure 1: Survival Rates by Founder CEO
We expected in hypothesis 3 that founder CEOs would be more likely to leave.  Results
reported in Table 2 and Figure 2, however, do not support the hypothesis.  The survival rates
of founder and non-founder CEOs who left in the fifth year after the IPO are .66 and .64,
respectively.  A slight difference, however, resides in the survival rates in the first three years
after IPO.  While the founder CEO’s risk of leaving in the first year after IPO is just .03, the
non-founder CEOs’ risk is .11.  The founder CEO’s risk increases faster after this initial safety
period and catches up with the non-founder CEO’s risk before the end of fifth year.
Table 3 presents results of additional hypothesis testing.  We used the Weibull model,
an event history method, in which we do not have to presume that effects of independent
variables are constant all the time (see Bloosfeld & Rohwer, 1995; Yamaguchi, 1991).
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Table 3: Results of the Weibull Models
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Executive Ties with Suppliers -0.14 0.29 -0.29 0.30
Executive Ties with Financial
Institutions
-0.19 0.65 -0.62 1.02
Executive Ties with Government 0.60 0.33+ 2.47 1.30*
% of Outside Directors 1.15 1.04 3.50 1.66*
Founder CEO 1.08 0.59+
President CEO 1.04 0.67
Full-Time CEO -2.65 1.00**
CEO's Years of Service -0.12 0.10
Reduction of CEO's Stock 1.86 2.47
Service 0.73 0.40+ 0.82 0.42** 0.73 0.58
Size of Organizations 0.19 0.10+ 0.17 0.10+ 0.60 0.21**
Foreign Firm -13.14932.11 -12.83820.05 -20.0053,839
Constant -6.18 0.95*** -6.99 1.19*** -10.32 2.66***
Log p 0.89 0.17*** 0.94 0.17*** 1.02 0.21***
P 2.43 2.57 2.77
1/p 0.41 0.39 0.36
Log Likelihood -56.33 -54.51 -31.74
x2 7.74 11.37 26.32
P > x2 0.05 0.12 0.01
Note 1:  + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Note2: p is a shape parameter in the Weibull model.
Table 4: A Summary of Results
Hypothesis                                                                                       Support         
1. Linkages with external environment reduce CEO turnover. Mixed support
· Supplier & financial linkages reduced turnover
· Government ties increased turnover
2.  Outsiders on board of directors increases CEO turnover. Supported
3.  Founder CEO is more likely to leave. Not supported
4.  President – CEO is more likely to leave. Not supported
5.  Part-time CEO is more likely to leave. Supported
6.  Tenure of the CEO at IPO reduces turnover. Supported
7.  Selling shares at the IPO (reducing ownership) increases turnover.Supported
As stated in hypothesis 1, interorganizational linkages with suppliers and financial
institutions slow down CEO turnover, though the coefficients are not significant.  By providing
stable resource inflows, these linkages may help CEOs hold their positions.  However, contrary
to what we hypothesized, interorganizational linkages with the government shorten CEO
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tenure and speed up replacements of CEOs (b = 2.47, p < .01 in the full model).  As noted
above, there is not much variance in the government tie variable.  We presume that what we
learned here is not significantly important because of this reason1.
We found significant support for hypothesis two, which posits positive effects on CEO
turnover as a result of having outsiders on the boards of directors.  As expected, larger
proportions of outsiders shorten CEO tenure.
Both hypotheses four and five suggest effects of information concentration on CEO
power and, thus, CEO turnover.  Only hypothesis five, regarding full-time status of the CEO,
received significant support.  Full-time CEOs are slower to leave their organizations (b = 2.65,
p < .01 in the full model).
Other hypotheses did not receive significant support.  As found in the life table analysis
above, the overall speed of founder CEO turnover is not quite different from that of non-
founder CEOs.
As suggested in hypothesis six, tenure slows down CEO turnover (b = -.12 in the full
model).  While we did not specify the anticipated direction of effects in hypothesis seven, it
turns out that Reduction of CEOs’ Stock (amount sold by the CEO) has positive effects on
CEO turnover (b = 1.86).  This may be because firms become less financially dependent on
CEOs by going public.  The reduced dependence on CEOs may enable the firms to dismiss
the CEOs.  On the other hand, it our results may be due to CEOs voluntarily leaving their firms
(they cash out and choose to pursue a different career).  This issue is discussed in detail in the
next section.
DISCUSSION
Our study was designed to understand the effects of a variety of variables on CEO
tenure after the company’s IPO.  Some of the hypotheses were supported, while some
received partial support, and some were rejected. Table 4 summarizes the results.
In summary, we found that (1) presence of outsiders in the boards of directors
increases CEO turnover, and (2) CEO commitment to the firm (via tenure and being full time) is
associated with longer tenure.  We also obtained findings, though not significantly supported,
that (1) interorganizational linkages with suppliers and financial institutions slow down
                                                 
1  We did not remove the government tie variable for the following two reasons.  Many of previous studies (i.e. Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978) suggest the importance of examining ties with the State.  In fact, the government ties have been found to
have effects on various organizational outcomes.  The second reason is that this variable is found to have no high correlation
with other covariates.  This alleviates our concern that leaving this variable changes the whole regression because of the high
multi-colliarity.
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replacement of CEOs by providing environmental stability, (2) being the founder is not related
to CEO turnover, and  (3) selling stock after IPO increases the chance of turnover.
We found support for the usefulness of network and resource dependence theories in
understanding CEO turnover in our sample of IPO firms.  First, we discovered, consistent with
a series of co-optation studies (i.e. Selznick, 1949), that organizations lose autonomy over
some of their activities in an attempt to stabilize resource flows and, particularly in their political
environment (see also Davis & Powell, 1992; Donaldson, 1995).  The lost autonomy in this
research context is CEO tenure.  Firms may need to sacrifice CEO tenure in order to
effectively manage their environment.  Given that co-optations enable firms to procure
resources for  survival, our findings suggest that firms may attempt to increase organizational
survival at the sacrifice of CEO tenure.
Our second theoretical contribution is partial support for the positive effects of CEO
power on the tenure.  However, contrary to our expectations, the effects of CEO power on the
tenure are relatively weak.  This is probably because power structures in IPO firms are
unstable during our observation periods.  While external actors may begin to increase and
exercise their influences after IPO, their power may not have been institutionalized before
year-end 1992 (5 year after the IPO).  CEOs may use their power obtained before IPO to
respond to external threats to replace them.  Dynamic processes are going on just after the
IPO between firms and the external actors so that this dynamism may entangle the effects of
CEO power on the tenure.
Third, our analysis did not render support to an argument that interorganizational
linkages extend CEO tenure by increasing organizational capabilities to manage environment
and procure resources.  The means and standard deviations in Table 1 for three variables
about the interorganizational linkages indicate that IPO firms in our sample indeed do not have
many interorganizational linkages.  The small variance in these covariates may be a cause of
the non-significant findings for the interorganizational linkage argument.  Although this data
problem explains why we did not obtain significant findings, a question remains unresolved
why the IPO firms do not have many interorganizational linkages.  This is probably because
these firms do not have slack resources so that CEOs and executives need to spend more
time and energies on internal concern than on cultivating resource networks (Schermerhorn,
1977).  Therefore, we speculate that lack of slack resources in IPO firms creates small
variances in our data that result in non-significant findings for the linkage arguments.
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Our findings also suggest several practical implications.  Many people (venture
capitalists, CEOs, academics) think that an entrepreneur / founder who is likely to make a
company successful from inception to IPO is often not the person to take the company to the
next stage.  Our results suggest that if the founder /CEO can make it to the point of the IPO,
then he/she is likely to be able to manage the firm in the next stage of growth.  We found no
significant differences between founder / CEO tenure and non-founder tenure.  Additional
research on this issue would help our understanding of the process of entrepreneurship,
leadership, and the growing firm.
Additionally, we found that having outside board members and selling shares were both
associated with CEO tenure after the IPO.  These events may be associated with a CEOs
intention to leave.  If the CEO wants to leave the company, and is concerned about the future
of the company, then he/she may ‘stack’ the board with outsiders in order to bring new
perspectives and new contacts into the firm.  By selling shares, the CEO may be increasing
his/her wealth, but at the same time, the CEO is making the firm less dependent on one
person and providing more shares to the public to be traded (thus, creating opportunity for
stock price to increase).  These two things are associated with the CEO leaving but are also
things that should help the organization continue to grow.  More research on the actions taken
by the CEO after the IPO, and the reasons for those decisions, is needed to further
understand our results.  Perhaps board members (such as venture capitalists or other
investors) would have insights into the topic that would be useful in aiding our understanding.
Limitations
As in any study, our research has limitations that should be taken into consideration
when interpreting the findings.  First, our measure of CEO turnover was obtained from the
annual proxy statements of firms in our sample.  This means that we were not able to
determine when the CEO left the firm, only if he/she was still there when the proxy was
completed.  In addition, the measure was confounded by the fact that some firms ceased to
exist.  Their reason for not being in business may be due to bankruptcy, merger, acquisition, or
going private.  The CEO at the firm at the time of the IPO may still be with the organization in
the case of the merger or if it goes private.  Given our lack of data, we could not do as
complete a study as we would have preferred.  Future research that can assess in more detail
the status of the CEO (and perhaps the reasons for their leaving or staying) would be useful.
Second, future research should examine effects of organizational performance on CEO
turnover.  Findings in previous research about effects of financial performance are mixed.
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While some found that poor performance triggers CEO turnover (i.e. Osborn et al., 1981;
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985), the others found that performance has small or no effect on the
turnover (i.e. Frizel, Luie, & Mentzer, 1990; Weisbach, 1988).  Puffer and Weintrop (1991)
found that it is differences between actual earning per share and security analysts’ forecasts
about earnings that trigger turnover.  However, most of the previous studies are not based on
data from entrepreneurial firms.  We do not know much about how organizational performance
influences CEO turnover in entrepreneurial companies.
Additionally, our study was conducted on a fairly specific type of sample, IPO firms that
initiated their offering in 1988.  The 1988 sample may represent a less risky group of firms
because it immediately followed the 1987 stock market crash.  We do not yet know whether
our results are generalizable beyond the year of our data collection or beyond the sample of
IPO firms.  Future research is needed to address this issue.
Lastly, our measures of CEO power and ties with the environment are somewhat
limited.  Future research will benefit by choosing samples of IPO firms that are more recent as
the SEC requires more data than they did in 1988.  In addition, we suggest that researchers
supplement archival data with our data sources (such as surveys, press releases, interviews)
in order to obtain a richer data set.
Conclusion
Our research examines determinants of CEO turnover in a sample of IPO firms.  Our
major arguments in developing hypotheses are that (1) interorganizational linkages extend
CEO tenure by increasing organizational capabilities to procure resources and stabilize
environment, (2) co-optations lead to less organizational autonomy and shorten CEO tenure,
and (3) CEO power extends CEO tenure.
CEO turnover in 120 IPO firms is examined with an event history analysis for testing the
seven hypotheses.  One of our findings supports the co-optation arguments in that co-
optations, though allowing firms to manage political environment and stabilize resource
inflows, increase CEO turnover.  While some of the hypotheses were not supported, these
non-significant findings also present several interesting implications about (1) dynamism of
power structures after the IPO, (2) lack of slack resources in IPO firms, (3) the role of individual
actors and organizational growth in IPO firms, and (4) CEOs’ strategic action to use the IPO to
cash out.
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Appendix 1: Variable Lists
Executive Ties with
Suppliers
Sum of executives’ ties with suppliers.
Executive Ties with
Financial Institutions
Average of executives’ ties with investment banks, banks,
venture capitalists, and investing firms.
Executive Ties with
Government
Sum of executives’ ties with government.
% of Outside
Directors
Percentages of outsiders in the board of directors.
Founder CEO Whether or not is a CEO a founder? (Yes = 1; No = 0)
President CEO Whether or not is a CEO also a President? (Yes = 1; No = 0)
Full-time CEO Whether or not is a CEO a full-time CEO? (Yes = 1; No = 0)
Reduction of CEO’s
Stock
Percentages of CEO’s stock shares after IPO divided by
percentages of CEO’s stock shares before IPO.
Service Whether or not is a firm in service industries? (Service = 1;
Manufacturing = 0)
Size Logarithm of the number of regular employees.
Foreign Firm Whether or not is a firm a foreign firm? (Yes = 1; No = 0).
